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WHO DETERMINES WHAT IS EGREGIOUS? 
JUDGE OR JURY: ENHANCED DAMAGES AFTER 
HALO V. PULSE 
Brandon M. Reed* 
INTRODUCTION 
Enhanced damages in patent law are a type of punitive damage 
that can be awarded in the case of “egregious misconduct” during the 
course of patent infringement.1 Authorization for enhanced damages 
comes from 35 U.S.C. § 284, which allows the district court to 
increase total damages up to three times the amount of actual 
damages found by the jury.2 It is well understood that, since 
enhanced damages are punitive in nature, enhancement should only 
be considered for cases of “wanton” or “deliberate” infringement.3 
However, determining what constitutes this “egregious” misconduct 
has vastly transformed over time to include a negligence standard, a 
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thank my wife, Anna, for her love and support throughout law school. Finally, I would like to thank my 
son Harrison. Although he is still too young to know it, I will forever be grateful for his love and 
laughter during my third year of school.  
 1. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (2016) (“Courts of Appeals 
likewise characterized enhanced damages as justified where the infringer acted deliberately or 
willfully . . . .”); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 710, 
722 (D. Del. 2011) (“Enhanced damages not only operate as a punitive measure against individual 
infringing defendants, but they also serve an overarching purpose as a deterrence of patent 
infringement.”). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. 
In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). 
The term “treble damages” is used throughout case law due to the court’s ability, by statute, to triple the 
amount of actual damages. See Treble Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 3. See, e.g., Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (holding enhanced damages when the infringement was 
“willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—
characteristic of a pirate”); Power Specialty Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 80 F.2d 874, 878 
(2d Cir. 1936) (“There is no justification for punitive damages here as upon wanton, deliberate, and 
willful infringement.”); Baseball Display Co. v. Star Ballplayer Co., 35 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1929) 
(“[T]here should be allowed damages on them, proven to be in excess of profits and, because of the 
deliberate and willful infringement . . . .”). 
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two-prong recklessness standard, and recently a court-discretion 
standard.4 
In the 2007 In re Seagate decision, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit sought to clarify what determined willful 
infringement, creating a two-part test for enhanced damages.5 The 
first part of the Seagate test asked whether the infringer acted 
“despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement.”6 The second part asked whether, subjectively, “the 
risk of infringement ‘was either known or so obvious that it should 
have been known to the accused infringer.’”7 The Federal Circuit 
considered the test’s objective prong a question of law for a judge, 
and considered the subjective prong a question of fact for the jury.8 
Although Seagate guided district courts for nearly a decade, many 
opponents of the test considered the two-prong inquiry “unduly 
rigid,” thus “insulating some of the worst patent infringers from any 
liability for enhanced damages.”9 As a result, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (denying any rigid formula for determining enhanced damages and 
instead leaving the determination to the discretion of the district court); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 
F.3d 1360, 1370, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (creating a two-prong test that requires first a showing 
of objective recklessness by the infringer, and then a subjective belief by the infringer of potential 
infringement), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Underwater 
Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (creating an “affirmative 
duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing”), overruled by In re Seagate 
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 5. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930 (discussing the test created in In re Seagate to establish the case for 
willful infringement). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371) (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 8. Sadao Kinsahi, Seagate Objective-Reckless Standard is Question of Law to be Decided By Judge 
and Subject to De Novo Review, WESTERMAN HATTORI DANIELS & ADRIAN, LLP (June 28, 2012), 
http://cafc.whda.com/2012/06/seagate-objective-reckless-standard-is-question-of-law-to-be-decided-by-
judge-and-subject-to-de-novo-review/ [https://perma.cc/R2E4-CKGU] (summarizing that the Federal 
Circuit decision In re Seagate holds the subjective prong is a question of fact for the jury to decide, but 
the objective prong is purely a legal question to be determined by the judge). The determination that 
there were separate questions of law and fact was not inherent after In re Seagate. The Federal Circuit 
confirmed this assessment by stating “the objective determination of recklessness, even though 
predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, is best decided by the judge as a question of 
law . . . .” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 9. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932; see also Colin Hendricks & David Breiner, Patent Pirates Beware: 
Enhanced Damages after Halo, BROWNWINICK (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.brownwinick.com/news-
blogs/intellectual-property-blog/patent-pirates-beware-enhanced-damages-after-halo.aspx 
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abrogated the test with its 2016 decision Halo Electronics v. Pulse 
Electronics.10 Instead of creating a new test or determining how a 
judge or jury should decide whether enhanced damages are 
appropriate, the Supreme Court left the decision up to the discretion 
of the district courts.11 With this decision, the two-part framework no 
longer provides instruction on who decides whether to award 
enhanced damages.12 Without guidance on whether the judge or the 
jury determines whether to award enhanced damages, defendants will 
become increasingly uncertain of whether the court will find 
“egregious cases of misconduct” in “garden-variety cases” of 
infringement.13 This Note discusses the impact of Halo v. Pulse on 
determining whether a judge or a jury decides whether willful, 
egregious misconduct justifies enhanced damages under 
35 U.S.C. § 284. 
Part I of this Note introduces Section 284 of the Patent Act, 
examines the tests created by the Federal Circuit, and discusses 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/8EC4-48LT] (“Seagate allowed patent pirates to avoid ‘walking the plank’ of 
enhanced damages after choosing to purposefully infringe on a valid patent.”); Drew Meunier, Supreme 
Court Decision Impacts Product Launch Strategy, MEUNIER CARLIN & CURFMAN LLC (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.mcciplaw.com/blog/supreme-court-decision-impacts-product-launch-strategy/ 
[https://perma.cc/5WX4-AQ9L] (“[T]he Seagate test . . . allowed an accused infringer to avoid enhanced 
damages by raising a substantial question as to the validity or non-infringement of the patent, even if he 
was not aware of the arguable defense when he acted.”). 
 10. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (abrogating the two-part Seagate test for enhanced damages). 
 11. Id. at 1928 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)) (“Section 284 
gives district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages against those guilty of patent 
infringement. In applying this discretion, district courts are ‘to be guided by [the] sound legal principles’ 
developed over nearly two centuries of application and interpretation of the Patent Act.”). 
 12. See Howard Wisnia & Thomas Jackman, Reconsidering the Standard for Enhanced Damages in 
Patent Cases in View of Recent Guidance from the Supreme Court, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 
461, 473 (2015) (arguing that willfulness was historically considered a question of fact entirely for the 
jury to decide). The question is now whether the courts should refer to historical precedent for 
determining willful infringement, or whether Halo has created a new standard. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1928 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s appellate framework separating question of law and question of 
fact in determination of enhanced damages). 
 13. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933, 1935 (guiding the district court to only find for enhanced damages 
in the case of “egregious” misconduct); see also Brian E. Ferguson, So Long, Seagate: A New Test for 
Willful Patent Infringement, LAW360 (June 14, 2016, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/771835/so-long-seagate-a-new-test-for-willful-patent-infringement 
[https://perma.cc/M62M-GW49] (discussing the great deal of uncertainty with an “egregious 
misconduct” test, and stating that companies may begin to settle rather than be subject to enhanced 
damages for “garden-variety” infringement). 
3
Reed: Who Determines What Is Egregious? Judge or Jury: Enhanced Damages
Published by Reading Room, 2018
392 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
historical interpretations of whether a judge or a jury should impose 
enhanced damages.14 Part II discusses the arguments made for 
allowing a judge or a jury to assess enhanced damages.15 Part III 
discusses a proposal for having the judge consider the issue of 
enhanced damages by holding a post-trial, Enhanced Damages 
hearing to determine the egregiousness of the case.16 
I.   Background 
Although enhanced damages became a staple of patent law in 
1793,17 the method of applying the remedy has changed drastically 
since its inception more than 220 years ago.18 Enhanced damages 
started as a mandatory trebling for all infringements, and progressed 
to a discretionary standard until Congress created the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.19 Over the past thirty years, 
the Federal Circuit altered the issue’s determination by first creating 
a legal duty and then progressing to the two-part objective and 
subjective test.20 Most recently, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
the Federal Circuit’s strenuous tests and gave district courts 
discretion regarding enhanced damages.21 District courts are 
therefore left with broad discretion on enhanced damages and little 
guidance on how willfulness plays into their determination.22 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (defining the new factor as “egregious misconduct,” and stating not 
all egregious misconduct may require a reward of enhanced damages); see also infra Part III. 
 17. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793) (creating the first account of treble 
damages on the finding of infringement). 
 18. See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C. 
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
 20. See infra Part I.B; see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (creating the two-part test to determine enhanced damages); Underwater Devices Inc. v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (creating a duty to obtain advice 
from counsel regarding potential infringing activity). 
 21. See infra Part I.C; see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (creating the discretionary standard for 
enhanced damages). 
 22. See infra Part I.C. 
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A.   Creating Discretion for Enhanced Damages 
Enhanced damages in patent law are “[d]amages for patent 
infringement in an amount up to three times that of compensatory 
damages, at the discretion of the court, based on the egregiousness of 
the defendant’s conduct, including the willfulness of the 
infringement.”23 Although the origins of enhanced damages trace 
back nearly to the ratification of the United States Constitution,24 the 
process for determining enhanced damages has changed over the past 
220 years.25 The Patent Act of 1793 contained the first substantial 
legislation regarding enhanced damages.26 In the Act, treble 
damages—enhanced damages up to three times the amount of actual 
damages—were mandatory and automatically applied to the 
judgment in any case where the jury found infringement.27 With this 
new system in place, the infringer’s state of mind was irrelevant; if 
the jury found infringement, the damages awarded were tripled.28 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 24. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 25. See id. (discussing the difference between the Patent Act of 1793 and 1836); Seymour v. 
McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1853) (discussing the changes to enhanced damages between The 
Patent Act of 1790, The Patent Act of 1793, and The Patent Act of 1836). 
 26. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 320, 322 (1793). Note that the Patent Act of 
1793 was not the first patent act passed by Congress. The Patent Act of 1790 essentially established the 
terms of patents, the process for application, and the eligible subject matter, among other things. It did 
not mention enhanced damages, but only that an infringer “shall forfeit and pay to the said patentee or 
patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a 
jury.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11 (1790). 
 27. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793). The section states: 
That if any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing so invented, 
the exclusive right of which shall, as aforesaid, have been secured to any 
person by patent, without the consent of the patentee, his executors, 
administrators or assigns, first obtained in writing, every person so 
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least 
equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or 
licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention; which may be 
recovered in an action on the case founded on this act, in the circuit court 
of the United States, or any other court having competent jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 28. See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488 (“The defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith, claiming 
under a junior patent, was made liable to the same penalty with the wanton and malicious pirate.”). The 
original Patent Act of 1793 assessed damages by determining what a normal license would be for the 
patent holder, plus a forfeiture against the defendant in an amount three times that sum. Id. However, the 
Act of 1800 changed the assessment to actual damages plus a forfeiture by the defendant in an amount 
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Therefore, in this early system, neither the judge nor the jury had the 
discretion to determine whether, upon the merits of the case, 
enhanced damages were appropriate.29 
The Supreme Court and Congress both came to the realization that 
trebling damages in all cases would lead to punishing good-faith 
infringement.30 In the Patent Act of 1836, Congress, therefore, 
removed the mandatory language and made enhanced damages 
discretionary.31 Trial judges, with the new-found discretion to 
enhance damages, retained control of the decision to enter a 
judgment for enhanced damages against a defendant for more than a 
century.32 Although a determination of “willfulness,” per se, was not 
yet part of the enhanced damages assessment,33 historically it is clear 
                                                                                                                 
equal to three times the sum of the actual damages. Id. 
 29. See id. at 488–89 (discussing the “injustice” of treating all infringers the same and the change in 
1836 to make enhanced damages discretionary); see also Evans v. Hettich, 20 U.S. 453, 453 (1822) 
(emphasis added) (“[I]f you should find a verdict for the plaintiff, you will give the actual damages 
which the plaintiff has sustained, by reason of the defendant’s use of his invention, which the Court will 
treble.”); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1018 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) (emphasis added) (“If the 
jury should be in favour of the plaintiffs upon these points, they will find for the plaintiffs the actual 
damages sustained by them, by reason of the use by the defendants of the discovery to which they are 
entitled; which the court will treble.”). 
 30. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488–89 (discussing the injustice of a “horizontal” rule applying to all 
infringement and arguing that Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1836 to “obviate this injustice”); 
Stephanie Pall, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically Sound? A Proposal to Restore Willful 
Infringement to its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 666 (2006) (arguing 
Congress’s idea of treble damages “evolved from concerns about adequate compensation to the current 
focus on punitive damages as a deterrent mechanism”). 
 31. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836) (emphasis added) (“[I]t shall be in 
the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found by such a verdict as the 
actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the 
circumstances of the case . . . .”). 
 32. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489 (“The power to inflict vindictive or punitive damages is committed to 
the discretion and judgment of the court within the limit of trebling the actual damages found by the 
jury.”); Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Gilbert, 269 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[W]e could not find it an 
abuse of discretion if the judge had trebled the defendant’s profits . . . .”); Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. 
Co., 28 F. Cas. 1107 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877) (No. 16, 987) (“[A plaintiff] may recover a penalty to the extent 
of treble damages, if the judge sees fit to inflict it.”); Stimpson v. R.R., 23 F. Cas. 103 (3d Cir. 1847) 
(No. 13,456) (“[T]he court are [sic] not compelled to treble the actual damages assessed by the jury, but 
may increase them or not at their discretion within that limit.”). 
 33. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489 (using the terms wanton and malicious to determine if enhanced 
damages are appropriate). The term “willfulness” did not become a staple until more than a century after 
the court gained discretion to enhance damages. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D. 
Cal. 1958) (emphasis added) (“The absence of willfulness, of course, would call for the denial of treble 
damages.”). 
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that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a 
determination of enhanced damages was a question of law for the 
judge.34 
B.   Willfulness and the Federal-Circuit Era 
The Patent Act of 1952 created Section 284, which gives the courts 
statutory authority to enhance damages.35 Although the new Act 
clarified the language of the enhanced-damages provision, how 
courts assessed the damages remained unchanged from the Act of 
1836.36 Around the time of the Federal Circuit’s establishment in 
1982,37 the notion of “willfulness” in patent infringement started to 
gain recognition as a question of fact.38 Under this assessment of 
willfulness, it would seem logical that the determination to enhance 
damages would be left solely to the jury.39 Considering the due 
process rights of an alleged infringer, “[o]ur system of law generally 
subscribes to the precept that questions of law are determined by a 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Contra Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“The ultimate question of willfulness has long been treated as a question of fact.”); Wisnia 
& Jackman, supra note 12, at 473 (“Historically, courts, including the Federal Circuit, have treated the 
willfulness determination under § 284 as entirely a question of fact for the jury.”). 
 35. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284) 
(stating that the statute in force after the Act of 1952 did not substantively change the law that existed 
prior to the Act, including the treble provision as it existed in 1836), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. 
Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 36. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016) (stating that the changes 
made in 1952 were to clarify the language, but treating the assessment of willfulness consistent with this 
history and precedent regarding patent damages). 
 37. See infra note 146 (discussing the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
 38. See Creative Cookware, Inc. v. Northland Aluminum Prods., 678 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that the issue of willfulness is a question of fact, and holding the remainder of the matters in the 
case were to be reviewed by the abuse-of-discretion standard upon appeal); see also Leinoff v. Louis 
Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The trial court may award increased 
damages, in its discretion, upon proof of willful and wanton infringement. The willfulness of 
infringement is a question of fact.”). The notion of willfulness being a question of fact surfaced as early 
as 1969; however, the frequency in which the notion was addressed as a question of fact increased after 
1982. See Malco Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Connector Corp., No. 4-61 Civ.243, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10554, 
at *8–9 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 1969) (mentioning that willfulness of infringement is a question of fact). 
 39. See Alan N. Herda, Notes and Comments: Willful Patent Infringement and the Right to a Jury 
Trial, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 181, 199 (2003) (“[A] jury determination is necessary because the 
finding of willfulness is analogous to a jury determining whether to award punitive damages in actions 
tried at law in 1791. Therefore, the historical test proves that the Seventh Amendment right extends to a 
jury determination on willfulness in patent infringement suits.”). 
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judge, while questions of fact are determined by a jury.”40 However, 
despite the understanding that willfulness is factual, judges regularly 
made the determination alone.41 
Regardless of who determines infringement’s willfulness, in 
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., the Federal 
Circuit—within the first year of its existence—attempted to settle at 
least what constituted willful infringement by applying a duty of due 
care.42 The Federal Circuit offered the guidance that there is a “duty 
to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the 
initiation of any possible infringing activity.”43 By creating a test that 
mirrors a negligence standard, the Federal Circuit seemed to bolster 
the argument that willfulness is a question of fact for the jury.44 The 
Circuit’s new test considerably weakened the standard for enhanced 
damages, and plaintiffs began to abuse the low-cost, high-reward 
activity of asking for the punitive-type damages in every 
infringement case.45 The standard particularly affected the case if the 
jury decided whether to enhance damages, because failing to obtain 
counsel created a presumption of willfulness.46 If the jury already 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Kristin K. Woodward, Owners and Occupiers of Land Now Owe Those Lawfully on Their 
Premises a Duty of Reasonable Care Under Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 
(1996), 76 NEB. L. REV. 184, 201 (1997). 
 41. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 393 (2000) (discussing the differing outcomes between a judge and a jury 
determination of willfulness, as well as discussing the factors used by the judge to determine 
willfulness, including deliberate infringement). 
 42. See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (instituting a duty of due care on the infringer to show that she sought and obtained legal advice 
about possible infringing activity), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 43. Id. at 1390. 
 44. See Bronson v. Oakes, 76 F. 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 1896) (“[N]egligence is a question of fact for 
the jury, and it does not cease to be such although the facts are undisputed, for that would be to deprive 
a suitor of his constitutional right to have the material facts in his case tried by a jury.”). 
 45. See Justin P. Huddleson, Objectively Reckless: A Semi-Empirical Evaluation of In re Seagate, 15 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 125 (2009) (discussing how litigants were using enhanced damages as a 
litigation strategy rather than affording a possibility of increasing damages). 
 46. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1091–92 (2003) (discussing the impact of failing to obtain counsel on the 
ultimate issue of infringement). 
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found infringement, then a finding of willfulness would be a much 
easier assessment for the jury.47 
In order to strengthen the analysis for willfulness and abandon the 
negligence standard established in Underwater Devices, the Federal 
Circuit created a new standard with their 2007 decision, In re 
Seagate.48 The court created a two-part test to determine enhanced 
damages.49 The first part of the test was an objective analysis 
requiring “a patentee [to] show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”50 The court 
considered the second prong only if the patentee satisfied the 
“objective recklessness” prong.51 The second, subjective prong 
required the plaintiff to “demonstrate that this objectively-defined 
risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it should have been 
known to the accused infringer.”52 The court instructed that the first 
prong—objective recklessness—was a question of law for the judge, 
while the second prong—subjective risk—was a question of fact for 
the jury.53 The court reasoned, in Bard Peripheral Vascular v. W.L. 
Gore, that the judge “is in the best position for making the 
determination of reasonableness” and left the willfulness analysis to 
both the judge and the jury in their respective parts of the test.54 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. (“While [the] presumptions are rebuttable, in practice they are likely to have a strong impact 
on a jury that has just concluded that the patent is valid and the defendant an infringer.”). 
 48. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he duty of care announced in 
Underwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that is more akin to negligence.”), 
abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Alex Czanik, Willful Patent 
Infringement: Bard v. W.L. Gore’s Thoughtful Shift from Jury to Judge, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 283, 287 
(2013) (“Underwater Devices’s low standard failed to align with willfulness in the civil context and was 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.”). 
 49. Czanik, supra note 48, at 287 (“Seagate established a two-prong test that still serves as the 
backbone for willful patent infringement.”). 
 50. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 51. Czanik, supra note 48, at 288. 
 52. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 53. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“The court now holds that the threshold objective prong of the willfulness standard enunciated in 
Seagate is a question of law based on underlying mixed questions of law and fact and is subject to de 
novo review.”); Wisnia & Jackman, supra note 12, at 474. 
 54. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1006. 
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C.   Abrogation of the Seagate Test by Halo v. Pulse 
The Seagate test seemed to accomplish its intended goal: the abuse 
of unfounded willful-infringement claims decreased because it was 
much more difficult for a patent holder to prove both objective 
recklessness and subjective belief in the risk of infringement.55 
However, many people, particularly patent holders, thought the rule 
was too rigid and the test let many potential bad-faith infringers off 
the hook by merely making a colorful invalidity argument against the 
claims in question.56 
Two cases caused the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the 
issue of willfulness.57 In the first case, Halo Electronics sued Pulse 
Electronics for infringement of patents Halo held regarding electronic 
packages.58 Although the jury found a high probability of willful 
infringement, the district court declined to enhance the damages 
because Pulse provided a reasonable defense and therefore did not 
satisfy the objective recklessness prong of the test.59 In the second 
case, Stryker Orthopedics sued Zimmer Orthopedics for infringement 
of a surgical device patent.60 The district court awarded treble 
damages, noting that Zimmer “all but instructed its design team to 
copy Stryker’s products.”61 Still, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
enhanced damages were not appropriate because Zimmer offered 
“reasonable defenses” at trial.62 
In response to the concerns of “malicious” infringers avoiding the 
punitive effects of enhanced damages, in June 2016 the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Ferguson, supra note 13. 
 56. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016) (“The Seagate test 
further errs by making dispositive the ability of the infringer to muster a reasonable defense at trial, even 
if he did not act on the basis of that defense or was even aware of it.”); Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 2, 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 14-1513), 2015 WL 9450143, at *2 
(“The Federal Circuit’s rigid per se rule ties the hands of judges and lets bad faith infringers off the 
hook.”). 
 57. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930–31. 
 58. Id. at 1930. 
 59. Id. at 1931. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14-1520, at 77a). 
 62. Id. at 1931. 
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Court abrogated the Seagate test with their Halo v. Pulse decision.63 
The Court reasoned that, regardless of any proffered defense, 
“Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of 
culpable behavior.”64 However, the Court provided no framework for 
determining whether to enhance damages.65 Rather, after Halo v. 
Pulse, courts now determine enhanced damages solely through their 
own discretion.66 The Court offered district courts a single piece of 
guidance: enhanced damages should be applied strictly in cases of 
egregious misconduct.67 
The new discretionary standard leaves litigants without a firm test 
for enhanced damages.68 Questions remain as to how the new 
standard will play out in the district courts and the Federal Circuit.69 
Will the assessment revert to enhancing damages only if the judge 
sees fit to enforce them?70 If a jury decides, will a duty of due care 
resurface to persuade a jury that the infringement was willful?71 
Furthermore, does it even matter whether a judge or a jury decides if 
the conduct was egregious if the judge is the one who determines by 
how much to increase the damages?72 Since the decision in Halo v. 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 64. Id. at 1933–34 (discussing the error in providing a rigid framework to determine enhanced 
damages when the Act does not prescribe such a test). 
 65. Id. at 1934 (“[W]e eschew any rigid formula for awarding enhanced damages 
under § 284 . . . .”). 
 66. Id. (quoting Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014)) 
(“Section 284 gives district courts discretion in meting out enhanced damages. It ‘commits the 
determination’ whether enhanced damages are appropriate ‘to the discretion of the district court’ and 
‘that decision is to be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.’”). 
 67. Id. (“Consistent with nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent law, however, such 
punishment should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”). 
 68. See Ferguson, supra note 13 (“The elimination of the Seagate standard and its replacement with 
a much more amorphous ‘egregious misconduct’ test is unfortunate because it introduces a great amount 
of uncertainty going forward for patent defendants.”). 
 69. See id. (discussing how companies will now have to speculate how the new standard will play 
out and stressing that the Federal Circuit must vigorously enforce “the Supreme Court’s warning that 
only instances of true egregious misconduct merit enhanced damages awards”). 
 70. See Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. Co., 28 F. Cas. 1107, 1107 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877) (No. 16, 987). 
 71. Ferguson, supra note 13 (“[T]he uncertainty and risk that a garden-variety infringement case 
may be distorted by aggressive patentees into one demonstrating egregious misconduct, particularly in 
patentee-friendly forums, is acute.”). 
 72. See Roberta J. Morris, Open Letter to the Supreme Court Concerning Patent Law, 83 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 438, 446 (2001) (“The jury may enter a special verdict on willfulness, but then 
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Pulse, the Federal Circuit has already stated that the jury determines 
the factual circumstances of “willful infringement.”73 Therefore, the 
only understanding afforded litigants is that willfulness is still a 
factor when courts analyze “egregious misconduct.”74 
II.   The Analysis of Judge Versus Jury 
There are several approaches to assessing whether a judge or jury 
decides an issue.75 The first and most obvious approach determines if 
the authorizing statute’s text suggests there is no right to a jury.76 The 
second approach considers Seventh Amendment implications, and 
Markman v. Westview Instruments provided a test for this approach, 
which asks if the issue existed at common law prior to the ratification 
of the Seventh Amendment.77 A final approach considers precedent 
on the issue before and after the Federal Circuit’s creation, including 
previous tests used for determining willfulness.78 
A.   A Statutory Interpretation of Section 284 
Before inquiring whether a statute implicates a constitutional right 
to trial by jury, the first inquiry contemplates whether Section 284 
                                                                                                                 
the court, not the jury, decides whether to multiply the actual damages by a number between 1 and 3.”). 
 73. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We do not interpret Halo as 
changing the established law that the factual components of the willfulness question should be resolved 
by the jury.”). 
 74. See supra Part I.B (discussing how willfulness as an assessment for enhanced damages gained 
prevalence only after the inception of the Federal Circuit). 
 75. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998) (discussing first the 
construction of the statute in an attempt to avoid a Seventh-Amendment analysis and then progressing to 
the constitutional analysis); see also infra Part II.A, II.B. 
 76. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345; see also infra Part II.A. 
 77. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. The Markman historical test sought to determine if a preexisting 
common-law right existed prior to 1791; if one did not, it asked whether a common-law right analogous 
to the issue in question existed. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). The 
test then progressed to determine if a jury was required to preserve that common-law right. Id. 
 78. See infra Part II.C. Prior to the Federal Circuit, a determination of willfulness was vested solely 
with the district court judge. See supra Part I.A. Furthermore, precedent from the Fifth Circuit, prior to 
the Federal Circuit, suggests there is no right to trial by jury for enhanced damages. See Swofford v. B 
& W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964) (“No discretion is vested in the jury . . . .”). Lastly, the 
case Read Corp. v. Portec, heard by the Federal Circuit, suggested nine factors to use in determining 
egregiousness of the case. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Part I.C. 
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even suggests a judge may solely decide to enhance damages.79 The 
relevant clause of Section 284 regarding enhanced damages states, 
“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess 
them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed.”80 At first glance, the phrase 
“the court may” seems to indicate that Congress left the trial judge 
discretion to enhance damages above the actual damages already 
found.81 In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, the Supreme 
Court considered similar “court” language in the context of statutory 
damages in copyright law and found that such language did not show 
congressional intent to provide a right to trial by jury.82 
The language of interest in Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act 
included the phrase “the court in its discretion may increase the 
award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”83 
In Feltner, the Court considered other provisions within the 
Copyright Act for guidance as to whether “court” meant judge or 
jury.84 The Court considered sections that used “court” in reference 
to powers universally understood as vested in the judge—such as 
injunctions and awarding attorney fees.85 Looking at relevant 
sections surrounding Section 284 of the Patent Act leads to a 
conclusion similar to that found in Feltner. First, Section 283 uses 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 
n.6 (1974)) (“We recognize, of course, the ‘cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether 
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.’”). 
 80. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). The statute is preceded by the clause indicating what damages are 
appropriate for a finding of infringement. “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the 
court.” Id. 
 81. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345–46 (holding language in a similar statute for statutory damages in 
copyright law that states “the court in its discretion” may find for statutory damages did not show 
congressional intent to provide a right to trial by jury). 
 82. Id. 
 83. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010). 
 84. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346 (stating that other sections of the Copyright Act “use[d] the term ‘court’ 
in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, rather than a jury”). 
 85. Id. (noting that other sections include the word “court” while providing discretion to grant 
injunctions, destruction of documents, and award attorney fees). 
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the phrase “courts” in granting the power to issue injunctions.86 
Second, Section 285 uses the term “court” to grant the power to 
award attorney fees.87 Third, Section 284 uses the word “jury” within 
the statute directly before the word “court.”88 If the word “jury” 
means the same as the word “court,” the phrase would read 
ambiguously and redundantly.89 Therefore, should the Supreme 
Court consider whether Congress intended to grant the right to trial 
by jury for enhanced damages, the Court may similarly hold “no,” as 
they did in the context of copyright law statutory damages in 
Feltner.90 
B.   Seventh Amendment Implications 
1.   Introduction to the “Historical Approach” 
According to Feltner, after the court determines Congress did not 
intend to confer the right to trial by jury in the statute, the next 
question is whether the Seventh Amendment nonetheless assures 
such a right.91 Although case law has addressed the inquiry of 
whether “willfulness” is a question of law or a question of fact,92 
neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court has considered the 
Seventh Amendment implications.93 The Seventh Amendment to the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured 
by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party.”). 
 88. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess 
them.”). 
 89. Id. The ambiguity is created if “court” meant “jury” because the sentence would read as: when 
the damages are not found by the jury, the jury shall assess them. Id. 
 90. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 347 (“We thus discern no statutory right to a jury trial when a copyright 
owner elects to recover statutory damages.”). 
 91. Id. at 345 (discussing Seventh Amendment implications only after determining the statute did 
not grant the right of trial by jury). 
 92. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that willfulness is a 
question of fact set by the Federal Circuit’s precedent); see also Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing willfulness as a mixed of a 
question of law and of fact). 
 93. Herda, supra note 39, at 183 (“[T]he Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court with 
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United States Constitution confers a right to trial by jury by stating, 
“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”94 
One test to determine if a right to trial by jury applies to an issue 
comes from the landmark case Markman v. Westview Instruments.95 
The test consists of: 
[D]etermining: (1) whether the current cause of action 
either was a common law action in 1791 England, or is 
analogous to a cause of action that was available in 1791, 
and (2) whether the issue in question “must fall to the jury 
in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right 
as it existed in 1791.”96 
2.   Finding an Analogous Pre-1791 Legal Right to Trial by Jury 
To date, the only analysis regarding the existence of a 
common-law right to trial by jury on enhanced damages revolves 
around the correlation between infringement and willful 
infringement.97 This is not to say that “willfulness” is the correct test 
for enhanced damages,98 see infra Part II.C, but rather that a Seventh 
Amendment analysis on enhanced damages can be made regardless 
of what test is appropriate.99 First, the Markman test asks if there was 
                                                                                                                 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, has not answered this constitutional question . . . .”). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 95. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (discussing the 
“historical test” used to determine if a cause of action existed prior to the ratification of the United 
States Constitution). 
 96. Herda, supra note 39, at 191 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 
376 (1996)). 
 97. See id. at 193–94 (applying the Markman Test to a question of willful infringement); Wisnia & 
Jackman, supra note 12, at 474 (discussing the correlation made to copyright law because the statute at 
issue in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures also required a willfulness aspect to the infringement). 
 98. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016) (stating that egregious 
misconduct is typified by willful infringement but not holding that willful infringement is necessary for 
enhanced damages); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Whether 
the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to warrant enhancement and the amount of the enhancement that 
is appropriate are committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”). This distinction is discussed 
in detail infra at Part III.A.1. 
 99. See infra Part II.C; see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1929 (stating that egregious misconduct is 
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a cause of action analogous to enhanced damages in England prior to 
the Seventh Amendment’s ratification in 1791.100 Scholars disagree 
as to whether an issue similar to enhanced damages existed prior to 
1791.101 On one hand, if you consider “egregious infringement” a 
species of the broader genus of “infringement,” then any 
infringement case tried in England prior to 1791 shows a cause of 
action for enhanced damages.102 This may not be an accurate way to 
look at enhanced damages because “[t]he Seventh Amendment 
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the 
character of the overall action.”103 The issue to be tried regarding 
enhanced damages is whether there was egregious misconduct, not 
whether the defendant infringed the claims of the patent.104 
Furthermore, enhanced damages were clearly not awarded in the 
United States until Congress added the mandatory-trebling provision 
to the Act of 1793.105 Encouragement for enhanced damages 
essentially came from one man with a distaste for meaningless patent 
rights and a distrust for juries.106 Robert Barnes, a man with 
connections to Thomas Jefferson and George Washington and with 
difficulties enforcing his patent rights, argued that the system prior to 
1793 granted no more meaningful rights to patent holders than if 
there were no laws at all.107 Further support that enhanced damages 
                                                                                                                 
typified by willful infringement, but not going so far as to state that willful infringement is necessary to 
show egregious misconduct). 
 100. See Herda, supra note 39, at 192. 
 101. See id. (stating the test is easy because patent infringement is statutory and therefore analogous 
to statutory infringement suits tried at law in England prior to 1791). But see Wisnia & Jackman, supra 
note 12, at 474 (stating that there was no requirement for willfulness in any suit prior to 1791). 
 102. See Herda, supra note 39, at 192 (correlating the cause of action for infringement to all 
sub-issues regarding infringement). 
 103. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). 
 104. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (stating that enhanced damages are reserved for egregious 
misconduct in the case of patent infringement). 
 105. Supra Part I.A. 
 106. Samuel Chase Means, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent Law’s Willful 
Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999, 2007–08 (2013) (discussing 
how Joseph Barnes, a man with strong political ties, argued that patent rights were meaningless without 
a stronger right against infringement, thus creating the first mandatory trebling of damages in patent 
law). 
 107. Id. at 2008. 
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are a product of post-1791 American Patent law comes from the fact 
that “[n]o case was found in which a British jury addressed the issue 
of increased awards or punitive damages in a patent infringement 
case.”108 
3.   Preserving the Common-Law Right to Trial by Jury 
If enhanced damages have no pre-1791 analogous legal right to a 
trial by jury, then the Markman historical test ends, and there is no 
right to trial by jury on enhanced damages.109 However, if it is 
successfully argued that the legal issue existed in English law prior to 
1791, then the next question considers if the issue “must fall to the 
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it 
existed in 1791.”110 
The first argument against a jury trial is that enhanced damages are 
not a legal right, but rather an equitable remedy.111 If this is the case, 
no trial by jury is necessary to preserve any right because equitable 
remedies were historically tried by a judge in England prior to 
1791.112 The argument is essentially that the original purpose of 
enhanced damages was not only to adequately compensate the patent 
holder, but also to prevent ongoing infringement and deter disregard 
                                                                                                                 
 108. John B. Pegram, The Willful Patent Infringement Dilemma and the 7th Amendment, 86 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 271, 280 (2004) (stating that only one case was found where a jury found 
more than nominal damages, but finding no case where a jury was asked to determine punitive damages 
or issue an increased award for infringement). 
 109. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). This is an assumption 
that the connector “and” in the test requires both (1) whether the issues was known in England prior to 
1791 and (2) whether the issue “must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-
law right as it existed in 1791.” See Herda, supra note 39, at 183 (quoting Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)). 
 110. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (articulating the two-part test of the Court’s Historical Test). 
 111. See Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (No. 14-
1520), 2015 WL 8754930 (arguing that the Act of 1793 added enhanced damages as a remedy because 
there was no adequate remedy at law). Cf. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 
345–46 (1998) (arguing that statutory damages, in the context of copyright law, are equitable in nature). 
 112. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 112-9, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: INTERIM EDITION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JULY 1, 2014, at 1679, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
CONAN-REV-2014/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ52-M88R] (stating the 
broad proposition that no equitable remedy requires a trial by jury and providing four cases for support). 
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for patent rights.113 During Senate hearings on the changes to the Act 
of 1836, which changed mandatory trebling to a discretionary 
standard, Senator John Ruggles urged that damages alone were 
inadequate by stating: 
The present law waits till infringements and frauds are 
consummated—nay, it even aids them; and then it offers an 
inadequate remedy for the injury, by giving an action of 
damages. It ought, rather, by refusing to grant interfering 
patents, to render prosecutions unnecessary. Instead of 
sanctioning the wrong by granting the privilege to commit 
it, it should arrest injury and injustice at the threshold, and 
put an end to litigation before it begins.114 
Senator Ruggles, therefore, considered enhanced damages a 
deterrent, and possibly a preventative injunction to the public, rather 
than compensation for infringement.115 
However, the court generally typifies monetary relief as “legal 
relief,” and thus any compensation related to infringement damages 
is arguably legal relief.116 The parties in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures 
argued that statutory damages in copyright law were equitable by 
nature.117 The Court did not find this argument persuasive because 
they saw all remedies associated with compensation and punishment 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 3–4 (“The main reason for mandatory trebling at the time 
was Congress’s concern that, because plaintiffs lacked access to equity to prevent ongoing infringement, 
actual damages alone were inadequate to compensate patentees and to deter disregard for patent 
rights.”). 
 114. JOHN RUGGLES, S. REP. ACCOMPANYING S.B. NO. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (Apr. 28, 
1836), reproduced in CHISUM ON PATENTS, app. 12 (2017). 
 115. See id.; see also Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a preventative 
injunction as “[a]n injunction designed to prevent a loss or injury in the future”). 
 116. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (“We have recognized the ‘general rule’ that monetary relief is 
legal . . . .”); see Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining Equitable Remedy as 
“[a] remedy, usu. a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or specific performance, obtained when 
available legal remedies, usu. monetary damages, cannot adequately redress the injury”). 
 117. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (arguing that statutory damages are by nature equitable and not arguing 
that they somehow fall outside the presumption that monetary damages are legal remedies). 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/3
2018] WHO DETERMINES WHAT IS EGREGIOUS? 407 
as historically legal rights.118 What the respondents in Feltner failed 
to argue—which the Court noted—was that there are examples of 
monetary relief historically regarded as equitable remedies.119 In 
Feltner, the Court mentions that an analogy exists between certain 
statutory damages and disgorgement of improper profits, which is an 
equitable remedy.120 This argument proves persuasive because 
enhanced damages result from egregious misconduct relating to 
“malicious” infringement, and courts characterize disgorgement as 
“[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) 
on demand or by legal compulsion.”121 However, this argument still 
may not stand, as the Supreme Court does not consider disgorgement 
equitable if the remedy is also a form of punishment.122 
Different methods exist, outside of the legal or equitable 
characterization, for ascertaining whether a trial by jury is necessary 
to preserve a legal right.123 Two other tests are: (1) to determine if the 
issue is a question of law or a question of fact, or (2) to determine if 
the issue is analogous to another, similar common-law issue.124 
Considering the first test, the inquiry is whether “egregious 
misconduct” is a question of law or a question of fact.125 Before June 
2016, this question had an answer.126 The Seagate test was a two-
pronged test, where one prong was subjective and a question of fact, 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 353 (arguing precedent shows actual damages, remedies intended to punish, and exemplary 
damages in divorce were all issues held to be historically legal issues for a jury). 
 119. Id. at 352 (stating that respondents, Columbia, did not argue or try to draw an analogy between 
statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) and causes of action such as disgorgement of improper 
profits that are characterized as equitable relief). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 122. Cf. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 423 (1987). The argument may be sound that enhanced 
damages are similar to disgorgement of improper profits; however, Tull suggests that, when such a relief 
is also used to impose punishment, it is more akin to equitable relief. Id. 
 123. Herda, supra note 39, at 193 (discussing two different tests to determine if an issue is to the 
“substance of the common-law right”). 
 124. Id. at 192 (“Two such methods are distinguishing between issues of law and fact, and comparing 
the issues in question to analogous common law issues in 1791 England—a historical test of the issue 
within the overall historical test of both the action and the issue.”). 
 125. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (stating that egregious 
misconduct is the standard under which enhanced damages should be reviewed). 
 126. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Seagate two-prong test and the analysis made as to whether 
egregious misconduct is a question of fact or question of law). 
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and the other prong was objective and a question of law.127 However, 
the decision in Halo v. Pulse abrogated that test, and now there is no 
longer a multi-part framework to determine enhanced damages.128 
Regardless, questions of fact do remain when deciding if “egregious 
misconduct” exists.129 However, as seen in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, when the matter “falls somewhere between a pristine 
legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at 
times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than 
another to decide the issue in question.”130 Therefore, even though an 
issue may present a question of fact, the line between fact and law is 
probably not so bright-lined that it precludes the issue from judicial 
determination.131 
Another approach, other than asking if the inquiry is a question of 
law or fact, determines whether any common-law issues existing in 
1791 are analogous to enhanced damages.132 One clear case is that 
enhanced damages are most similar to punitive damages.133 Courts 
consistently consider enhanced damages as a type of punitive 
damage.134 Punitive damages existed in England prior to 1791, and in 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (maintaining that the subjective threshold remains a question of fact for the jury, but holding that 
the “threshold objective prong of the willfulness standard enunciated in Seagate is a question of law 
based on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, and is subject to de novo review”). 
 128. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (abrogating the two-part test of In re Seagate and the tripartite 
framework of review). 
 129. See id. at 1933 (stating that culpable behavior is indicative of egregious misconduct); see also 
United States v. Kiestler, Nos. 92-5099, 92-5600, 92-5601, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13092, at *6 (6th 
Cir. May 21, 1993) (“The determination of a defendant’s degree of culpability is a question of 
fact . . . .”). 
 130. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
 131. Herda, supra note 39, at 193 (noting how the Supreme Court deemphasized the 
law/fact-determination test for determining if a jury trial is needed to preserve a legal right). 
 132. Id. (stating the two separate tests to determine if a legal right exists). 
 133. Id. at 193–94 (finding that “[i]ncreased damages under § 284 are analogous to punitive damage 
awards . . .” and offering four comparisons regarding how the two are similar). 
 134. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (2016) (“We continued to describe 
enhanced damages as ‘vindictive or punitive,’ which the court may ‘inflict’ when ‘the circumstances of 
the case appear to require it.’”); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (E.D. 
Va. 2003) (“Enhanced damages not only operate as a punitive measure against individual infringing 
defendants, but they also serve an overarching purpose as a deterrence of patent infringement.”). 
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those early cases, juries determined punitive damages.135 Therefore, 
this connection between punitive damages and enhanced damages in 
patent law seems to suggest that the second prong of the Markman 
historical test, or whether the issue “must fall to the jury in order to 
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 
1791,” would require the jury to determine enhanced damages.136 
However, there remains firm disagreement as to whether a judge 
and not a jury should consider punitive damages.137 One argument 
for allowing the judge to determine whether to award punitive 
damages is that “judges are in a better position to impose a 
punishment that is in line with the punishments imposed for similar 
misconduct, [and] determination of the amount of punitive damages 
by judges would promote the interest in treating like cases alike.”138 
However, history still indicates that punitive damages were a legal 
right in England prior to 1791.139 If the issue of enhanced damages 
makes it past the first question in the Markman test, a successful 
analogy to punitive damages will pass the second question of the test, 
thus establishing a right to trial by jury on enhanced damages.140 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Herda, supra note 39, at 196–97 (discussing the origins of punitive damages as they first 
surfaced around 1763). 
 136. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
 137. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 596 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating in 
the context of awarding punitive damages that one cannot “expect those jurors to interpret law like 
judges, who work within a discipline and hierarchical organization that normally promotes roughly 
uniform interpretation and application of the law”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and 
Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) (“Some observers 
suggest that allowing judges, not juries, to set punitive award levels will improve civil justice.”). But see 
Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 521 N.W.2d 921, 926 (S.D. 1994) (“Blinders should not be placed 
on a jury when it is called upon to assess punishment, i.e., punitive damages.”). 
 138. Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 179, 212 
(1998). 
 139. Id. at 183 (stating that, although the punitive damages of today are different than those in 
England prior to 1791, punitive damages did exist as early as 1763 in England). 
 140. Herda, supra note 39, at 198 (concluding that enhanced damages pass the first part of the 
Markman test and pass the second part of the test because of enhanced damages’ connection to punitive 
damages). 
21
Reed: Who Determines What Is Egregious? Judge or Jury: Enhanced Damages
Published by Reading Room, 2018
410 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
C.   A Stare-Decisis Approach to Section 284 
Precedent may also help establish who—judge or jury—should 
decide if enhanced damages ought to be rewarded.141 After the Act of 
1836 provided district courts with discretion to enhance damages, the 
inquiry remained within the control of the trial judge.142 In Seymour 
v. McCormick, an important case regarding the interpretation of the 
Act of 1836, the Supreme Court stated, “The power to inflict 
vindictive or punitive damages is committed to the discretion and 
judgment of the court within the limit of trebling the actual damages 
found by the jury.”143 Sole determination by the judge remained the 
procedure for more than one hundred years after the Act of 1836.144 
A question-of-fact analysis only surfaced when the notion of 
willfulness became a test around the mid-1950s,145 and the 
determination of “willfulness” caught on as the pivotal question 
around the creation of the Federal Circuit.146 Early use of 
willfulness—prior to the Federal Circuit—was merely advisory, and 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Wisnia & Jackman, supra note 12, at 474 (concluding that no pre-1791 precedent could help 
in a Markman test, and thus resorting to precedent to help establish the procedure). 
 142. See cases supra note 32. 
 143. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 489 (1853). 
 144. See, e.g., Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964) (“No discretion is vested 
in the jury; but they are required to find the actual damages, under proper instructions from the court.”); 
White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.2d 
287 (5th Cir. 1975) (“In these areas, however, the jury verdict was advisory only since trebling of 
damages in patent cases is always entrusted to the discretion of the Court in jury as well as non-jury 
trials.”); Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. Co., 28 F. Cas. 1107, 1107 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877) (No. 16, 987). 
 145. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, 13 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D. Mass. 1952). A search for 
“willfulness” or “willful” within the same paragraph of “enhanced damages” or “treble” in LexisNexis 
reveals the terms were not used together until the mid-1950s. One of the first cases discussing the matter 
of willfulness came in 1952, coincidentally around the Patent Act of 1952. Id. 
 146. A similar search as completed in supra note 145 shows the words “willful” or “willfulness” 
within the same paragraph as “enhanced damages” or “treble” a total of three times in the 1950s, a total 
of ten times in the 1960s, a total of seven times in the 1970s, and a total of forty-seven times in the 
1980s. See, e.g., Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1072 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Further, interrogatories 
could have covered the willfulness of infringement to provide support for the award of the treble 
damages.”); White, 369 F. Supp. at 1326 (“In so doing the Court included interrogatories designed to 
elicit the jury’s findings with respect to the willfulness of the alleged infringement and whether the 
compensatory damages should be trebled.”); Hartford Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. 
Supp. 353, 358 (D. Del. 1960) (“[I]t bears directly on the willfulness and the treble damages.”). The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created on October 1, 1982, to have exclusive jurisdiction 
for appeals regarding patents. Matthew B. Weiss, Options for Federal Circuit Reform Derived from 
German Legal Structure and Practice, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 358, 361 (2015). 
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the judge weighed a jury’s finding of willful infringement with all 
other circumstances when deciding if enhanced damages were 
appropriate.147 Although the Federal Circuit later held that 
evidentiary findings by juries on willfulness are non-advisory, the 
holding had very limited consequence—the judge can still refrain 
from awarding enhanced damages or even overturn a finding of no-
willfulness and award damages as a matter of law.148 
Therefore, even after willfulness became a main part of the 
enhanced damages consideration, and even after the Federal Circuit 
in In re Seagate created their two-part framework for willful 
infringement, judges regularly decided whether to award enhanced 
damages.149 Two cases prompted the Supreme Court to visit the issue 
of enhanced damages.150 In the case Halo Electronics v. Pulse 
Electronics, the district court declined to award enhanced damages 
even after a jury found a high probability that the defendants 
“willfully” infringed on the patent, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed.151 In the other case, Stryker Corporation v. Zimmer, Inc., 
the jury found willful infringement and the court awarded the 
damages to the plaintiff.152 Applying a de novo standard of review, 
                                                                                                                 
 147. White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he jury’s finding that defendants 
willfully infringed and therefore that the compensatory damages should be trebled is advisory only.”); 
Square Liner 360 Degrees, Inc. v. Chisum, No. 4-76-Civ. 134, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17776, at *38 (D. 
Minn. Nov. 2, 1981) “[T]he jury’s finding on willfulness or lack thereof is merely advisory . . . and the 
Court may increase the jury’s damage award if upon its own examination of all the circumstances the 
Court should find such an increase justified . . . .”). 
 148. Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“All fact findings of a 
jury are non-advisory, unless made in an area expressly removed from jury verdict.”). In summarizing 
the reasoning in Shiley, one article states the role of the jury in enhanced damages as follows: 
The jury’s findings on willfulness are non-advisory, but they have limited 
consequences. If the jury finds that the defendant did willfully infringe 
the patents, the court has discretion to refrain from awarding 
increased damages. If the jury finds no willfulness, the court may overturn 
the ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and 
award treble damages. 
Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent 
Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 109–10 (2001). 
 149. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930–31 (2016) (discussing the two 
cases that prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the issue of enhanced damages). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1931. 
 152. Id. 
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the Federal Circuit vacated the enhanced damages by finding the 
defendant asserted reasonable defenses to the infringement.153 
Therefore, even though the Seagate test was used in both cases, the 
outcomes demonstrated how willfulness remained a legal question 
for the judge’s determination.154 
However, the final outcome of Halo v. Pulse was an abrogation of 
the Seagate test.155 In Halo, the Supreme Court did not hold that 
willfulness was the overall determinant for “egregious” cases of 
misconduct.156 The Court instead stated that egregious misconduct is 
typified by willful misconduct.157 Since the decision, the Federal 
Circuit continues to read willfulness into the inquiry of “egregious” 
misconduct.158 The Federal Circuit reinforced its intent to retain its 
willfulness precedent by stating it “do[es] not interpret Halo as 
changing the established law that the factual components of the 
willfulness question should be resolved by the jury.”159 However, the 
Federal Circuit did go on to state: 
[Halo] leaves in place [the] prior precedent that there is a 
right to a jury trial on the willfulness question . . . . 
Whether the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to warrant 
enhancement and the amount of the enhancement that is 
appropriate are committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court.160 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1930–31. 
 155. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (abrogating the two-part framework of In re Seagate). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1934 (“Consistent with nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent law, 
however, such punishment should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful 
misconduct.”). 
 158. See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding on arguments 
of willfulness in the context of enhanced damages after Halo v. Pulse). 
 159. Id. at 1341. 
 160. Id. at 1341 n.13. 
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Therefore, the Federal Circuit continues to hold that willfulness is a 
question of fact, but the ultimate determination of egregiousness is a 
question of law.161 
In the wake of Halo v. Pulse, district courts began using different 
approaches to determine egregious misconduct.162 Some courts now 
completely rely upon the nine Read v. Portec factors created prior to 
the Seagate test.163 These factors ask the court to determine: 
(1) Whether [the] infringer deliberately copied; (2) 
Whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent, 
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-
faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; 
(3) The infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) 
Infringer’s size and financial condition; (5) Closeness of 
the case; (6) Duration of the infringer’s misconduct; (7) 
Remedial action by the infringer; (8) Infringer’s motivation 
for harm; and (9) Infringer’s attempt to conceal its 
misconduct.164 
Even the Read factors implicate some “evidentiary underpinnings” 
that “[fall] somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact.”165 For instance, deliberate copying—factor one—can 
be seen as synonymous with “willful infringement.”166 Such a 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. 
 162. Bruce Barker, A Review of Post-Halo Decisions on Enhanced Damages, CHAO HADIDI STARK 
AND BARKER LLP (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.chsblaw.com/single-post/2016/08/12/Under-Halo-Test-
For-Enhanced-Damages-Jury-First-Determines-the-Infringers-Willful-Intent-then-Judge-Assesses-
Egregiousness [https://perma.cc/VR8X-D333] (discussing the factors district courts are using to 
determine enhanced damages after the decision in Halo v. Pulse). 
 163. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Barker, supra note 162. 
 164. Barker, supra note 162. 
 165. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838, 842 (2015) (quoting Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388, 390 (1996)). Teva v. Sandoz expanded the holding 
in Markman—that claim construction is a question of law despite the “evidentiary underpinnings” of the 
issue—and held that the evidentiary underpinnings found by the judge are to be reviewed under the 
clear-error standard. Id. at 842. 
 166. See Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136728, at *61 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that copying is a lesser standard than willful because the alleged 
infringer went to a trade show before the infringement, and that “supports the inference the accused 
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correlation makes it seem that the factual inquiries of willfulness 
would also be considered in determining if deliberate copying 
existed.167 Furthermore, factor five considers the closeness of the 
case.168 Closeness of the case depends, in part, on the strength of the 
evidence for invalidity or infringement.169 Therefore, even this factor 
mixes both questions of fact and questions of law.170 
In the future, a determination of whether the judge or the jury 
decides if the conduct was “egregious” will help litigants know the 
likelihood of treble damages;171 will limit the progress of 
infringement trials by shortening how much time is spent on showing 
malicious intent;172 and will lower the cost of litigation by decreasing 
the abuse of willfulness allegations.173 Therefore, a determination 
                                                                                                                 
infringer ‘was at least reckless as to whether it copied’”); CleanCut, LLC v. Rug Doctor, Inc., No. 2:08-
cv-836, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16151, at *7–8 (D. Utah Feb. 4, 2013) (using the defendant’s 
“willful decision to offer substantially similar” products in determining the first Read factor weighed in 
favor of enhanced damages). 
 167. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016). In Halo the jury held 
that the defendant “all-but instructed its design team to copy Stryker’s products,” and this information 
was used in determining willful infringement. Id. 
 168. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827. 
 169. Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136728 at *65 (holding factor five as neutral 
because “[t]he affirmative defenses of invalidity due to prior art and obviousness were close calls.”); 
Arthur S. Beeman & Jeff Leung, How The ‘Read Factors’ Can Help Software Cos. Post-Halo, LAW360 
(Sept. 12, 2016, 12:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/836590/how-the-read-factors-can-help-
software-cos-post-halo [https://perma.cc/8BDG-87HR] (stating that courts look “[i]n favor of enhanced 
damages where strong evidence in support of infringement and against all invalidity theories”). 
 170. See Frederick L. Whitmer, Claim Construction in Patent Cases: A Question of Law?, 2 
LANDSLIDE, no. 6, July/Aug. 2010, at 4 (“Post-Framing precedent, moreover, characterizes the question 
of construing the patent as a question for the court and determining infringement as a question of fact for 
the jury.”); Maryann T. Puglielli, Obviousness, a Question of Law and Fact, Is Reviewable on JMOL in 
Certain Cases, FINNEGAN (Aug. 2010), http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/FCN_Aug10_3.html 
[https://perma.cc/2LU2-ZEB5] (discussing how motivation to combine—in the scope of obviousness 
and thus invalidity—is considered a question of fact, but when factual inquiries are not at issue, the 
issue is a question of law). 
 171. See Moore, supra note 41, at 393 (“Juries find willfulness in almost three of four cases (71%) 
and judges only find it half the time (53%), suggesting that juries are more easily convinced of an 
infringer’s thieving intent.”). 
 172. See Wisnia & Jackman, supra note 12, at 478–79 (“If defendants know that a jury will be 
considering their litigation behavior in the context of enhanced damages they will likely shift their 
behavior. Judges, unlike juries, are likely immunized to a certain extent by some of the more abusive 
litigation tactics that parties use.”). 
 173. See Means, supra note 106, at 2014 (“Willfulness claims are unnecessarily costing courts and 
litigants a fortune because: (1) patent litigation is expensive, (2) willfulness claims constitute a 
substantial proportion of that expense, (3) willfulness is almost always alleged in patent litigation, and 
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must be made as to whether the judge or the jury determines if the 
infringing conduct should result in enhanced damages. 
III.   Proposal 
Halo v. Pulse provided district courts with broad discretion to 
determine an infringing act’s egregiousness.174 The case also held 
that willfulness is not the ultimate question in determining whether 
enhanced damages are appropriate.175 Therefore, because 
egregiousness is the ultimate question, the Read factors provide a 
solid framework to assist the district court judge on the issue of 
egregiousness.176 Additionally, statutory interpretation, precedent, 
and the technical nature of patent infringement suggest that any 
factual determinations made regarding egregiousness should be 
considered solely by the judge.177 Therefore, a logical approach to 
ensure uniformity and finality to an enhanced damages award is to 
create a post-trial evidentiary hearing on the issue.178 
A.   Willfulness Is Not the Ultimate Question 
1.   The Read Factors Appropriately Address Egregiousness 
It must first be recognized that willful infringement is not the main 
question to ask when considering enhanced damages; rather, 
egregious misconduct is merely typified by willful infringement.179 
Precedent considering willfulness as mere guidance for assessing the 
                                                                                                                 
(4) infringement is almost never found to be willful.”). 
 174. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the abrogation of the In re Seagate framework and holding that 
a determination of egregious misconduct is in the discretion of the district court). 
 175. See id.; see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (stating 
egregious misconduct is typified by willful misconduct). 
 176. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 177. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 178. See infra Part III.B. 
 179. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“And while the Court 
explains that ‘intentional or knowing’ infringement ‘may’ warrant a punitive sanction, the word it uses 
is may, not must . . . . It is ‘circumstanc[e]’ that transforms simple knowledge into such egregious 
behavior, and that makes all the difference.”). 
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totality of the circumstances predates the Federal Circuit.180 The 
Federal Circuit also noted that egregiousness was the ultimate 
question in its 1992 Read v. Portec decision.181 Finally, the Court, in 
deciding In re Seagate, attempted to clarify that willfulness is not the 
ultimate question, but merely an important factor of egregiousness, 
by stating the following: 
To be sure, the majority rule has been that an award of 
enhanced damages pursuant to section 284 requires a 
finding of willfulness. However, the existence of this 
“longstanding controversy” adequately demonstrates that 
Congress was not merely reenacting consistently-
interpreted statutory language with the 1952 Act so as to 
justify the inference suggested in GM. Therefore, I am of 
the judgment that this court should not continue to read a 
willfulness requirement into section 284, to support the 
enhancement of damages. That said, willfulness remains a 
relevant consideration under section 284.182 
Therefore, when the Federal Circuit defined the scope of willfulness 
in In re Seagate, willfulness continued to be the pivotal question 
regarding enhancement.183 In Halo v. Pulse, the Supreme Court 
clarified that more than willfulness should be considered because 
“Section 284 permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a 
manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test,” and 
“courts should continue to take into account the particular 
                                                                                                                 
 180. White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
509 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the jury finding of willfulness was advisory for the court to 
use in their determination); Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 181. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A] finding of willful 
infringement does not mandate that damages be enhanced, much less mandate treble damages.”). 
 182. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 183. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1926. The Supreme Court found it important to abrogate the In re 
Seagate test because the determination of enhanced damages became too rigid. Id. at 1930, 1932. 
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circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award 
damages.”184 
The Federal Circuit originally created the Read factors to help 
determine egregiousness.185 Although some courts used willfulness 
as a “first-step” test for enhanced damages and then used the Read 
factors to determine the degree of enhancement,186 the proper use of 
the Read factors was, and still is, to determine the level of 
egregiousness and, in turn, whether enhanced damages are 
appropriate.187 This does not mean that willfulness is not an 
important aspect of determining egregious misconduct.188 The Read 
factors actually do consider the issue of willfulness. For instance, 
factor one asks if the alleged infringer deliberately copied the 
claimed invention.189 Deliberate copying may not, however, require 
willful copying, given that “the Federal Circuit held that willfulness 
does not require intentional infringement.”190 The Federal Circuit 
also held, however, that willfulness is a sliding scale that includes 
deliberateness: “‘Willfulness’ in infringement, as in life, is not an all-
or-nothing trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that infringement 
may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, 
disregard of a patentee’s legal rights.”191 Therefore, since the Read 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 1933–34 (2016). 
 185. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826 (“The paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement 
and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and 
circumstances.”). 
 186. See Cognex Corp. v. Microscan Sys., No. 13-CV-2027, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91203, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2014) (citations omitted) (“Although ‘[a] finding of willful infringement is a 
prerequisite to the award of enhanced damages, . . . [w]hether—and how much—to enhance an award of 
damages is determined by ‘the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and 
circumstances.’”); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17717, at 
*11–19 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014) (considering Seagate as the “first step of the test” for determining 
willful infringement, and then using the Read factors to determine amount of enhancement). 
 187. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826 (emphasis added) (“The paramount determination in deciding to 
grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all 
the facts and circumstances.”). 
 188. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (“The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously 
described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, 
flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.”). 
 189. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827. 
 190. Czanik, supra note 48, at 287. 
 191. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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factors appropriately determine if the case was sufficiently egregious 
to justify enhancing damages, the trial judge should use the factors in 
her determination. The judge should also consider willfulness as 
supplementing the Read factors while determining if the totality of 
the circumstances justify enhanced damages. 
2.   The Judge, Not the Jury, Should Determine Willfulness 
As discussed above, willfulness is a very important aspect in 
determining the egregiousness of the infringement. Although it has 
long been understood that courts have the discretion to decide the 
amount of the enhancement,192 Halo v. Pulse made it clear that the 
court also enjoys the broad discretion of determining whether 
enhanced damages are appropriate.193 Even so, patent damages can 
be multiplied by any number from one to three times the amount of 
actual damages found by the jury.194 If the judge has the authority to 
only multiply the damages by one, then it really does not matter if a 
jury decides if the infringement was willful or egregious.195 
Therefore, the judge should similarly have the authority to make the 
determination on the substantive issue of willful or egregious 
infringement. 
Furthermore, an alleged infringer does not have the right to a trial 
by jury for three reasons. First, Section 284’s text clearly indicates 
that the statute does not confer the right to trial by jury on the 
question of enhanced damages.196 The section states, “When the 
damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either 
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Morris, supra note 72, at 446 (“[T]he court, not the jury, decides whether to multiply the actual 
damages by a number between 1 and 3.”). 
 193. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (citation omitted) (“It ‘commits the determination’ whether enhanced 
damages are appropriate ‘to the discretion of the district court’ and ‘that decision is to be reviewed on 
appeal for abuse of discretion.’”). 
 194. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836). 
 195. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the limited consequence of the jury’s 
findings if the judge determines how much to increase the actual damages). 
 196. See supra Part II.A (discussing a similarity to copyright law and how the term “court” means 
“judge”). 
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amount found or assessed.”197 The Fifth Circuit agreed that “court” 
meant “judge” by acknowledging that substituting the word judge or 
jury into Section 284 would create ambiguity by essentially allowing 
the statute to “read nonsensically: ‘When the damages are not found 
by a jury, the (jury or judge) . . . shall assess them.’”198 
Second, the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a trial by jury 
for enhanced damages. Although the Federal Circuit stated that Halo 
v. Pulse “leaves in place [the] prior precedent that there is a right to a 
jury trial on the willfulness question,”199 this legal conclusion has 
differing precedent. The Fifth Circuit, prior to the creation of the 
Federal Circuit, held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to 
enhanced damages because the idea of enhanced damages is new to 
American patent law, and the Act of 1836 made clear that only actual 
damages are determined by the jury.200 In fact, use of the Markman 
test for determining Seventh Amendment rights, see supra Part 
II.B.1, clarifies that no right to trial by jury is required for enhanced 
damages.201 
Finally, judges are in a better position than juries to decide 
willfulness and egregiousness due to a judge’s ability to consider 
technical, yet objective facts—such as knowledge of a similar patent 
or possibility of infringement.202 Markman stressed that there are 
situations that blur the line between fact and law, and sometimes 
“one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the 
issue in question.”203 The case of enhanced damages in patent 
infringement presents one of those situations. Some questions in 
patent law impose complexities for which the judge is “better suited 
to separate subjective inquiry facts from objective inquiry facts.”204 
                                                                                                                 
 197. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 198. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1964). 
 199. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 200. See Swofford, 336 F.2d at 412–13. 
 201. Pegram, supra note 108, at 280 (“No case was found in which a British jury addressed the issue 
of increased awards or punitive damages in a patent infringement case.”). 
 202. Czanik, supra note 48, at 297–98. 
 203. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
 204. Czanik, supra note 48, at 298. 
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For example, many of the Read factors are better suited for a judge 
who has more training in the highly technical field of patent law. 
Factor two asks whether the infringer formed a good-faith belief that 
the patent was invalid.205 Claim construction is very important to 
whether a patent claim is valid, and Markman decided that claim 
construction, even though it contains many factual elements, is more 
appropriately determined by the judge; interpreting written 
instruments, especially in the highly technical area of patent 
litigation, is something judges often do.206 Additionally, deliberate 
copying contains elements of willfulness, or at least culpability, and 
“[a] jury lacks the experience acquired from years of sitting on the 
bench in determining which actions constitute objective 
recklessness.”207 Therefore, many aspects of egregiousness are, and 
have been determined to be, clearly appropriate for a judge to decide. 
B.   An Evidentiary Hearing for Egregiousness 
1.   The Test and Approach 
Since willful or egregious infringement shares many of the factual 
and legal questions found in claim construction, the holding and 
aftermath of Markman proves helpful in analyzing the appropriate 
handling of egregious misconduct. The Supreme Court believed that 
judges would not only more accurately determine claim construction, 
but would also create more uniformity in how claims are construed 
across jurisdictions.208 The holding in Markman created the 
“Markman hearing,” which judges conduct solely to construe a 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 206. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–89. 
 207. Czanik, supra note 48, at 298. 
 208. Timothy M. Salmon, Procedural Uncertainty in Markman Hearings: When Will the Federal 
Circuit Show the Way, 18 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 1031, 1032–33 (2004) (stating that the Supreme Court 
held that the trial court’s ability to interpret legal documents put them in a better position to interpret 
patent claims); see also Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The 
Supreme Court Giveth and The Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 244 (2002) 
(stating that a jury’s ability to sense human conduct is not as important in claim construction, and a 
judge’s determination will create more uniformity in decisions). 
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patent’s claims.209 A similar evidentiary hearing on egregiousness 
would prove beneficial to separate egregiousness from the issues of 
validity and infringement. Unlike in the Markman hearing, where the 
judge can either hold the hearing before considering infringement or 
later, before instructing the jury,210 the most beneficial time to hold 
an Enhanced Damages hearing would be after a post-trial motion to 
address the issue.211 Enhanced damages depend on whether the jury 
finds actual damages,212 and therefore the hearing can only take place 
after the jury concludes there was infringement and imposes actual 
damages. In these hearings, the judge will be able to make use of the 
evidentiary findings made at the trial. Furthermore, the hearing could 
be treated similar to a Markman hearing in regard to extrinsic 
evidence. Evidence not previously gathered during the course of the 
trial could supplement the decision of the trial judge if, and only if, 
the evidence at trial is not sufficiently persuasive to address the 
infringement’s egregiousness.213 
2.   The Benefits of a Post-Trial Enhanced Damages Hearing 
The benefit of a judge holding a post-trial hearing is three-fold. 
First, it will reduce prejudice toward the alleged infringer during the 
trial.214 Issues of culpability will not be the main focus of the trial if 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Salmon, supra note 208, at 1034. 
 210. Patent Tips, MARKMAN HEARING, http://www.markmanhearing.org/ [https://perma.cc/8TQM-
6KDN] (last visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
 211. See Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that a finding of 
“willfulness, deliberateness, and increased damages should properly await final judgment”); ANDREW J. 
PINCUS & BRIAN A. ROSENTHAL, MAYER BROWN, WHAT’S WILLFUL NOW? THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF 
THE SUPREME COURT’S HALO V. PULSE PATENT WILLFULNESS DECISION 15 (2016), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Event/6c269db6-c384-4830-aa4e-
557199cd36d5/Presentation/EventAttachment/fbd4fcfb-7525-462b-aff8-8082e410cbec/160616-WDC-
IP-WEBINAR-Halo-Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FTW-AXXK] (discussing how litigants may now 
begin asking for post-trial motions, outside the presence of the jury, on the issue of willfulness). 
 212. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 213. See Salmon, supra note 208, at 1035 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)) (stating that extrinsic evidence should only be used in a Markman hearing when there 
is “still some genuine ambiguity in the claims, after consideration of the all available intrinsic 
evidence”). 
 214. Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 
235 (2004) (“Willfulness evidence is among the most prejudicial and damages evidence among the most 
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willfulness is not at question when the ultimate issue of infringement 
is decided.215 Including information about the culpability of the 
alleged infringer at trial has a tendency to confuse the jury on other 
issues at trial—namely on validity and infringement.216 This will 
protect the defendant from a presumption of infringement due to any 
bad-faith practices undertaken in the course of their business or 
during litigation.217 
Second, a post-trial hearing on enhanced damages has the benefit 
of increasing the efficiency of the trial. Claims of willful 
infringement add another dimension to the trial and thus expend 
greater resources during the trial.218 The threat of willful 
infringement alone increases the cost of the litigation, as resources 
will certainly be spent trying to defend the alleged infringer’s 
conduct surrounding the infringement.219 Since less than 2% of all 
patent cases ever reach the merits of willful infringement, and less 
than 5% of patent cases are even decided at trial,220 determining 
willful infringement in a post-trial hearing will stop unnecessary 
litigation of willful infringement in cases that do not even reach their 
merits.221 
                                                                                                                 
complex. Eliminating this evidence from the trial would greatly simplify the issues and the trial.”). 
 215. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 148, at 94 (discussing how bifurcation of invalidity and 
willfulness can lower the prejudice towards the infringer). 
 216. See Moore, supra note 41, at 369–70 (discussing the biases juries have towards litigants and how 
juries are swayed by tangential factors such as willfulness). As discussed in Part III.B.1, the Read 
factors should be used by the judge in determining egregiousness. Therefore, other factors, such as 
whether the infringer “knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and 
formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed” will be considered in a post-
trial, Enhanced Damages hearing. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). These 
factors can also create a presumptive “willfulness” in the eyes of the jury, and therefore create the same 
type of confusion as “willfulness.” See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 46, at 1091–92. 
 217. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 46, at 1091–92. 
 218. Means, supra note 106, at 2016 (citations omitted) (stating that even though patent infringement 
does not ask about the culpability of the infringer, “[w]illfulness under the current law requires an 
inquiry into what the alleged infringer knew or should have known. Willfulness is therefore a factor that 
‘increases the cost and decreases the predictability of patent infringement litigation . . . .’”); Moore, 
supra note 214, at 235. 
 219. Moore, supra note 214, at 235. 
 220. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re 
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 436 (2012). 
 221. See Moore, supra note 214, at 232 (discussing how 92% of all patent infringement cases 
included a claim of willful infringement without any factual support). 
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Finally, allowing a judge to determine egregiousness in a post-trial 
hearing will create consistency across jurisdictions. Judges are better 
positioned to make determinations of objective facts such as 
knowledge of a similar patent or possibility of infringement.222 Prior 
to In re Seagate, one study found there was no statistically-
significant difference when a judge or a jury found willful 
infringement.223 After In re Seagate, judges began declining 
enhanced damages awards because they regarded the evidence 
considered by the jury as particularly weak.224 It is understood “that 
when the evidence supporting a jury’s willfulness findings is 
relatively weak, it is appropriate for the district court to not award 
enhanced damages.”225 Therefore, now that courts no longer use the 
Seagate test, a judge deciding the issue of enhanced damages in a 
post-trial hearing will not significantly differ from a jury deciding 
that issue.226 Also, a judge will not be inclined to disregard enhanced 
damages based on the weak evidence a jury considers. If the judge 
decides the infringement was egregious, then the judge will enhance 
the actual damages and the decision is final. 
3.   The Standard of Review 
The standard of review is a very important element for promoting 
the consistency of decisions. In Halo v. Pulse, the Supreme Court 
granted district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages.227 
The Court’s intent was to “allow[] district courts to punish the full 
range of culpable behavior.”228 What the Court did not address was 
the situation where the judge was acting as the fact finder—as would 
be the case in a post-trial hearing on enhanced damages. In 
Markman, the Supreme Court discussed this situation: the judge is in 
                                                                                                                 
 222. Czanik, supra note 48, at 297–98. 
 223. Seaman, supra note 220, at 467. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016). 
 228. Id. at 1933. 
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the best position to make determinations, but the inquiry includes 
“evidentiary underpinnings.”229 Even though the district court has the 
broad discretion to determine if enhanced damages are appropriate, 
subsidiary fact-finding—such as credibility of witnesses or extrinsic 
evidence—will be necessary in a post-trial, Enhanced Damages 
hearing.230 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Teva v. Sandoz is helpful to the 
situation, as in an Enhanced Damages hearing, where the judge will 
be making some historically-factual findings. The Court in Teva held 
that both Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
precedent suggest that issues that include factual determinations 
necessitate a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.231 There the 
Court separated decisions about claim construction from the district 
court’s legal determinations on the construction—factual 
determinations regarding the construction are to be reviewed for clear 
error, while the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim is 
reviewed de novo.232 A similar method would create consistency in 
enhanced damages inquiries by potentially lowering the Federal 
Circuit’s reversal rates.233 Factual determinations made by the judge 
in a post-trial hearing could be reviewed for clear error while the 
actual award of enhanced damages would be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. This would help create “national uniformity, consistency, 
and finality”234 for enhanced damages awards by requiring the 
                                                                                                                 
 229. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–90 (1996). 
 230. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (discussing the 
“evidentiary underpinnings” that come up when analyzing claim construction). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 841. 
 233. See Supreme Court Holds That Certain Aspects of Claim Construction Decisions Merit 
Deference on Appeal, WOLF GREENFIELD (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.wolfgreenfield.com/publications/ip-alerts/2015/aspects-of-claim-construction-decisions-
merit-deference [https://perma.cc/YJ4G-6X53] (discussing how a de novo standard of review by the 
Federal Circuit in claim construction creates unpredictability and high reversal rates on the issue). This 
statement suggests that a judge’s factual findings regarding willfulness should be reviewed only for 
clear error. A clear error standard, as opposed to a de novo standard, could help to reduce the Federal 
Circuit’s ability to reverse a finding of willfulness. See id. 
 234. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
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Federal Circuit to give deference to the district court’s fact-finding.235 
This strong standard of district court discretion is, after all, the intent 
of Section 284.236 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of enhanced damages in patent law has transformed a 
great deal since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.237 
Although the Federal Circuit developed different tests to assist in 
determining willful infringement, the Supreme Court held in Halo v. 
Pulse that the ultimate issue is the egregiousness of the infringement, 
and the district court has broad discretion to consider evidence of 
whether to impose enhanced damages.238 The question remains 
whether a judge should determine willfulness, regardless of whether 
it is the ultimate question for enhanced damages. 
Although the Federal Circuit continues to consider willfulness as a 
question of fact for the jury to decide,239 there is evidence that 
willfulness considerations in enhanced damages are not subject to the 
guarantees of a jury trial. The statute does not suggest that Congress 
intended to confer such a right;240 no common-law right significantly 
similar to enhanced damages existed prior to the ratification of the 
Seventh Amendment,241 and early precedent suggests that judges 
alone tried the issue of enhanced damages.242 
Since a judge has the authority to make the decision on enhanced 
damages, creating a post-trial hearing on enhanced damages, similar 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz, PATENTLY-O 
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deference-supreme-sandoz.html (discussing how 
viewing factual determinations through the clear-error standard may result in fewer reversals). 
 236. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016) (“Section 284 
permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the 
Seagate test.”). 
 237. See discussions supra Parts I.B, I.C. 
 238. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. 
 239. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 240. See supra Part II.A (discussing a similarity to copyright law and how the term “court” means 
“judge”). 
 241. Pegram, supra note 108, at 280. 
 242. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1964). 
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to the Markman hearings on claim construction, would foster judicial 
efficiency on the issue. In this hearing, the judge will consider the 
nine Read factors in deciding, under the totality of the circumstances, 
whether the infringement was egregious.243 In evaluating the nine 
factors, the judge can consider willfulness of the infringement in her 
determination. The judge should feel free to include willfulness 
inquiries in the factors that overlap with intent, such as “deliberate 
copying” in factor one; the judge should also feel free to include 
willful or malicious intent while determining the “closeness of the 
case.” 
Finally, the evidentiary conclusions made by the judge would be 
reviewed for clear error. However, the decision of whether and how 
much to enhance damages would continue to be reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Allowing judges to assess willful, egregious 
infringement will reduce prejudice at trial, increase judicial 
efficiency, and foster predictable outcomes in litigation.244 This 
method provides the district court the broad discretion granted by the 
clear language of 35 U.S.C. § 284.245 
                                                                                                                 
 243. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 244. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 245. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016). In summarizing the 
broad discretion of the district court judge, which the Supreme Court understands Section 284 grants, 
the Court stated the following: 
Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of culpable 
behavior. Yet none of this is to say that enhanced damages must follow a 
finding of egregious misconduct. As with any exercise of discretion, courts 
should continue to consider the particular circumstances of each case in 
deciding whether to award damages, and in what amount. Section 284 
permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the 
inelastic constraints of the Seagate test. 
Id. 
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